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MANAGING ISLANDS, MANAGING 
THE SEAS 
Robert Cribb and Michele Ford 
Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic state. By the latest official 
count, the archipelago consists of 18,108 islands, which lie scattered 
between the mountainous island of Breueh in the west and tiny Sibir 
Island in Humboldt Bay (Teluk Yos Sudarso) in the east, and between 
Miangas in the north and Dana in the south. Indonesia's islands range 
in size from New Guinea, Borneo and Sumatra, respectively the second, 
third and sixth largest islands in the world, to tiny islets with only local 
names (see Map 1.1).1 Situated between longitude 97°E and 141 °E and 
between latitude 6°N and 11°5, Indonesia con1prises 2.8 million square 
kilometres of water (including 92,877 square kilometres of inland waters) 
and 1,826,440 square kilometres of land. If Indonesia's exclusive eco-
nomic zone (EEZ), stretching beyond the archipelago, is included, Indo-
nesia's area of sea expands to 7.9 million square kilometres. 
Indonesia's archipelagic character creates two distinct but intertwined 
problems of governance. First, by separating Indonesia's landmass into 
islands, the sea creates special challenges of communication, coordina-
tion and even identity. Governing the land is made more difficult by the 
1 Although Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic state, it is exceeded 
in the number of islands by Canada's Arctic archipelago, which has 36,463 
islands and covers 1.4 million square kilometres; see 'Arctic archipelago', 
Cnnndinn Encyclopedia, http:/ jwww.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/, accessed 
25 November 2008. Indonesia's coastline, at 54,716 kilometres, is also a distant 
second to Canada's at 202,080 kilometres. Some 5,707 Indonesian islands pos-
sess official names (Kwiatkowska 1991: 14). 
Map 1.1 The Indonesian archipelago 
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intervening presence of the sea. Second, the seas that lie between and 
around these islands need to be governed. These seas represent a major 
strategic, economic and cultural resource for Indonesia; they cannot be 
ignored, yet governing the maritime zone poses enormous practical dif-
ficulties. 
ON BEING AN ARCHIPELAGO 
Indonesia's status as an archipelago has important consequences both 
for its identity as a nation and for its character as a state. Although Indo-
nesia's first president, Sukarno, confidently asserted that even a child 
could see that the arc of islands between Asia and Australia constituted 
a single national unit (Sukarno 1961: 11), most observers look at Indo-
nesia's geography and see the potential for fragmentation rather than 
a self-evident whole. To many people, islands seem destined by their 
very nature for separate existences and Indonesia's unity consequently 
has appeared to be fragile, artificial, perhaps even imaginary.2 The clos-
est geographical analogy to Indonesia, moreover, is a model of fragmen-
tation. The Caribbean archipelago, 7,000-odd tropical islands stretched 
between two continents, is marked by cultural diversity and a long colo-
nial history. Known to much of the world as the West Indies, it has a 
culturally diverse population of around 40 million. But it is divided into 
27 independent states and dependent territories. 
The practical reality is that Sukarno and the sceptics are both right: the 
sea divides and unites archipelagos in complex ways. The most powerful 
effect of the seas between the islands of an archipelago, however, is to 
separate those islands from each other, politically, economically, socially 
and culturally. The sea divides, because the process of moving people 
and cargoes safely from the shore onto the high seas is almost always 
more dangerous, more demanding of technology and more costly of time 
and effort than any such movement on land. A stretch of intervening 
sea magnifies the practical distance between two pieces of land. Yet the 
divisive force of the sea should not be overstated in comparison with 
that of land. In any large country sheer distance, whether overland or by 
sea, is divisive. So are differences in topography, climate and even time 
zone. The problems of governing the scattered islands of Indonesia are 
not demonstrably greater than those of governing the landmass of the 
Russian Federation or China. 
The sea also unites because, paradoxically, it collapses distance in a 
way that land does not. That is to say, once a traveller is safely aboard 
2 This issue is discussed in Cribb (1999). 
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and away from the hazards of the coast, the difference in danger, dif-
ficulty and cost between a long journey and a short one is much smaller 
than the comparable difference on land. There is no clearer proof of the 
advantages of a long, unimpeded journey over one involving multiple 
disembarkations than the fact that the transit around the Cape of Good 
Hope became the preferred route for transport between Europe and 
Asia soon after its discovery, despite the availability of the much shorter 
passage involving land transport across the Isthmus of Suez. And even 
today, there is a thriving ferry service between Jakarta and Surabaya, 
both on the island of Java, despite the availability of an overland con-
nection between the two ports. In Chapter 6 of this volume, David Ray 
illustrates the critical importance of loading costs to the overall cost of 
sea transport. The combined effect of the difficulty of going to sea and 
the collapsing of distance once at sea is that archipelagos, where mastery 
of sea-going technology is a necessity, tend to be well linked internally 
despite different distances between islands. These links are the basis for 
the separate political, economic, social and cultural identities of archi-
pelagos. Sukarno' s characterization of the archipelago may have been 
instinctive and naive rather than analytical, but his insight that archi-
pelagos have a natural unity was entirely apt. 
Indonesia's archipelagic character is qualified in two important ways. 
First, what we conventionally call the Indonesian archipelago is part of 
a much larger archipelagic assembly stretching between the continents 
of Asia and Australia and divided between Indonesia, Malaysia, Sin-
gapore, Brunei, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea. 
Indonesia even shares four islands- Borneo, Sebatik, Timor and New 
Guinea- with neighbouring countries. As parts of this larger archipe-
lagic assembly, Indonesia's islands are easily drawn into relationships 
with the islands of its neighbours. In Chapter 13 of this book, Michele 
Ford and Lenore Lyons discuss the intimate relationship between the 
Riau Islands and Singapore. Comparable relations could be identified 
between Sumatra and West Malaysia, between Indonesian and Malay-
sian Borneo, and even between northern Sulawesi and the Philippines. 
The fact that, once one can get off an island and aboard a vessel, the sea 
offers the possibility of travel in almost any direction has a distinctly cen-
trifugal effect. From a small island in the heart of Indonesia, one can sail 
directly to Singapore, or Hong Kong, or Port Moresby, or Darwin. The 
island of Bawean in the heart of the Java Sea, for instance, was a long-
term provider of labour to British Singapore in the colonial era, despite 
its proximity to Java (Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indie 1917: 212). 
In contrast, from a small town in the heart of Siberia, one's movement to 
the outside world is largely constrained by the trajectory of a few roads. 
Apparently peripheral islands, therefore, have a capacity to be engaged 
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with the wider world that is mostly unavailable to peripheral land-bound 
regions. 
Second, unlike many of the world's archipelagic states, Indonesia is 
actually a complex of archipelagos and large islands with a single domi-
nant island, Java. In this respect it resembles Britain, Fiji, Japan and New 
Zealand- and is correspondingly unlike the Philippines, the Maldives 
and Tuvalu, where the pre-eminence of the main island is much less pro-
nounced. The dominance of Java is not clear from simple geography, but 
it stands out if we represent the size of Indonesia's regions according to 
population (see Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1 Indonesia's archipelago by population 
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The disparity between the islands in terms of population means that 
Indonesian politics has historically been marked by a centre-periphery 
tension that has given rise to one of the most enduring perceived divi-
sions within Indonesia, that between Java and the outer islands (which 
the Dutch called the buitengewesten). Dutch dominance on Java was well 
established for at least a century and a half before major parts of the other 
islands came under effective Dutch control. This historical fact, together 
with Java's preponderance in population, its cultural self-confidence and 
its formidable economic assets, meant that Java set the model for the 
colonial governance of the archipelago (Dick 1996: 32). The inclusion in 
the Netherlands Indies of Sumatra- also with a substantial population 
and impressive economic resources- meant that the nation that emerged 
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within the shell of colonial rule in the first half of the twentieth century 
was more than merely Greater Java. 
Javanese have always dominated Indonesian politics, but they have 
never been the defining ethnic group of the Indonesian nation in the 
way that Han Chinese, Kinh (Viet) and Thai peoples, respectively, define 
China, Vietnam and Thailand, relegating other ethnic groups to minority 
status. The emergence of Malay, rather than Javanese, as the lingua franca 
of the colony and later as the national language of Indonesia is only the 
most obvious reflection of Java's failure to capture the identity of the new 
nation. The qualified nature of Javanese dominance enhances the sense 
that Indonesia's unity is fragile. A dozen or more of the non-Javanese 
ethnic groups in the archipelago are large enough to claim credibly a sep-
arate national status. In contrast, independence for any of the minorities 
in Vietnam, for instance, is highly implausible. Indonesia's basic ethnic 
configuration makes separatism a believable political option, but it is the 
country's archipelagic character that makes it seem actually practicable. 
For this reason, despite the fact that there have been only four serious 
separatist movements in Indonesia's six decades of independence- the 
Republic of the South Moluccas in the 1950s, and the East Timor, West 
Papua and Aceh separatist movements more recently- Indonesia's rul-
ers have displayed an obsession bordering on paranoia concerning the 
prospect of separatist movements (Emmerson 2005: 38). 
Yet, even though Indonesia's archipelagic character seems, at least 
potentially, to exacerbate disintegrative trends, the fact of being part of 
a vast archipelago also unites. Pride in belonging to a great state is an 
element in the nationalism of most large countries- in China, the United 
States and Russia as well as Indonesia- and the very fact of inhabiting 
the world's largest archipelagic state is a source of satisfaction to many 
Indonesians. This satisfaction is evident in the inflation of the number of 
islands officially said to comprise the archipelago. In 1963, the number 
of islands was formally estimated at 13,667; this tally took on an iconic 
quality and was not influenced by the appearance and disappearance 
of islands as a result of siltation, erosion, land reclamation and tec-
tonic movements? and not even by the 1976 annexation of the islands 
of Atauro and Jaco, off the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. In 
1994, the figure was revised upward to 17,508. (This total, too, remained 
unrevised when Indonesia lost Atauro and Jaco to independent Timor-
Leste in 1999.) In 2003, shortly after the loss of Sipadan and Ligitan to 
3 An earthquake in 2007 produced six new islands near South Pagai off the 
west coast of Sumatra; two islands were lost in the construction of Jakarta's 
Soekarno-Hatta International Airport. In 2007, the State Ministry for the Envi-
ronment estimated that Indonesia had lost 24 islands during 2005-07 (Muham-
mad 2008). 
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Malaysia under an International Court of Justice ruling, the figure was 
revised again to 18,108, an island being defined for this purpose as any 
piece of land surrounded by water and having an area greater than 30 
square metres.4 
Perhaps more important, there is some sense in Indonesia that being 
an archipelago is precisely what makes the country work, because it 
puts distance between groups that might otherwise clash. When former 
president Megawati Sukarnoputri announced her support for a bridge 
between Bali and Java in 2004, many Balinese opposed it because it 
would diminish Bali's isolation (Leinbach and Ulack 1999: 221; Pringle 
2004: 220-21). Greg Acciaioli has argued that Soeharto's New Order used 
the myth of a maritime way of life among all the peoples of the archi-
pelago across vast stretches of time to create a sense of identity that was 
effective because it sidestepped the practical political problems of life on 
land (Acciaoli 2001: 5-7). 
A number of scholars have used the metaphor of archipelago to high-
light the way in which dispersed institutions are able to share an iden-
tity because the physical distance that separates them is trumped by the 
social distance that detaches them from their immediate environment 
but unites them with each other. Alexander Solzhenitsyn (1974) coined 
the term 'Gulag archipelago' for the scattering of political prison camps 
across the face of the Soviet Union. These islands of incarceration shared 
a way of life and a complex social network in which people, goods and 
information were exchanged, but as islands they were detached from the 
society around them, except at those moments when they opened their 
gates to devour new victims. Alexander Randall used the term 'archipel-
ago' to characterize the shared, self-contained culture of American over-
seas military bases and their social isolation from their host communities 
(Randall1986: 61). Following Solzhenitsyn, many authors have given the 
term a somewhat sinister cast. Michel Foucault developed Solzhenitsyn's 
concept into the idea of a' carceral archipelago' of state institutions whose 
purpose was to discipline and punish society and which were able to do 
so precisely because they were dispersed through society, much like an 
archipelago (Foucault 1982: 302). Others have described as archipelagos 
so-called 'gated communities', middle-class residential districts in large 
cities that protect themselves from urban criminality by building walls 
and setting up controlled entry points to whole clusters of houses (Rodg-
ers 2004: 114). 
4 'Indonesia "finds" 500 islands', BBC Nezos, 20 February 2003, available at 
http:/ jnews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ asia-pacific/2784461.stm, accessed 9 November 
2008. For further discussion, see Hopper (1978: 35-8), Cribb (2000: 1-10) and 
Emmerson (2005: 11). 
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In Indonesia itself, the New Order's system of camps for suspected 
communist detainees following the 1965 coup also lends itself to an 
archipelagic metaphor (Cribb 2000: 171). More recently, Tom Boellstorff 
has identified a 'gay archipelago' characterized by what he calls 'islands 
of difference' -pockets of gay and lesbian culture embedded within 
but socially isolated from the majority heterosexual culture (Boellstorff 
2005: 7). In this usage, 'archipelago' as a social term starts to approach the 
term' diaspora' in meaning, differing only in that diasporas are generally 
presumed to relate to some (perhaps imagined) homeland, whereas an 
archipelago is unambiguously home to its people.s 
In short, there is an archipelagic dynamic, in which a sense of unity 
emerges despite dispersal and distance, that appears to operate in meta-
phorical archipelagos as much as in real ones. Indonesia's archipelagic 
character creates special problems, and a few special opportunities, for 
the Indonesian state. 
THE SEA IN INDONESIAN LIFE 
Very different from the task of n1anaging islands separated by the sea is 
the task of managing the sea itself. The vast area of sea that lies within 
and around the Indonesian archipelago is crucial to the Indonesian state 
for many reasons. The sea is an avenue of transport and communication. 
It connects Indonesia's islands with each other and it connects Indonesia 
with the rest of the world, carrying the imports and exports that sustain 
the economy. There are more than 750,000 dockings per year at Indone-
sian ports and those ports load more than 300 million tonnes of cargo per 
year.6 About 14 million Indonesians travel by sea each year to seek work, 
carry on business or visit family members. 7 Marine transport is provided 
by 1,156 registered shipping companies and approximately 10,000 ves-
sels (ESCAP 1999: 30). 
5 For a study that comes close to conflating archipelagos and diasporas, see 
Goldstein (2000). 
6 See Dick (1987); Rutz and Coull (1996); Statistics Indonesia, 'Inter island and 
international cargo loading and unloading, Indonesia 1988-2005', available 
at http://www. bps.go.id/ sector/ transpor /sea/ yearly/ table4.shtml, and 
'Number of ship's call at commercial and non commercial sea port Indonesia, 
1995-2005', available at http:/ jwww.bps.go.id/ sector/transpor/ sea/yearly/ 
table3.shtml, both accessed 9 November 2008. 
7 Figures record 14,737,000 passengers boarding commercial and non-com-
mercial shipping in Indonesia in 2005, but only 13,664,000 disembarking; see 
Statistics Indonesia, 'Number of ship's passenger at commercial and non com-
mercial sea port, Indonesia 1995-2005', available at http:/ jwww.bps.go.id/ 
sector/ transpor /sea/ yearly/ table5.shtml, accessed 9 December 2008. 
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The sea is also a source of vulnerability, a potential highway for ene-
mies and a conduit for unwanted people and goods. Colonial rule arrived 
in the archipelago aboard the ships of foreign powers. Indonesia is not 
a major final destination for illegal immigrants, but there is a significant 
flow of illegal entrants from the Middle East who either intend to stay 
or end up staying (OECD 2003: 254; Hunter 2006). In 2007, around 1,000 
Burmese seafarers were stranded in Tual after being discharged without 
papers by the Thai-flagged ships on which they were formerly employed 
(Higginbotto1n 2007: 19). The transit of illegal immigrants through Indo-
nesia to Malaysia and Australia has been a significant problem in rela-
tions with those two countries. Large numbers of Indonesians also cross 
illegally into neighbouring countries, most often for work (Hugo 1993; 
Ford 2006). In addition, there is a vast number of illegal border crossings 
which are not expected to lead to permanent settlement. They include 
border crossings by small-scale traders, sometimes in illegal goods, and 
fishermen. 
The sea is also an important economic resource. A wide range of 
marine life is harvested for human consumption- not just fish (including 
sharks) and shrimp, but also turtles, tripang and shellfish (Bentley 1996; 
Williams 2007: 40-42). It has been estimated that fish comprise 60 per 
cent of the protein consumed by Indonesians (Tomascik et al. 1997: 1,185; 
Williams 2007: 43-4). Marine life collected for commercial purposes also 
includes trochus, clams and other seashells, aquarium fish, coral and sea-
weed (Bentley 1999; Fougeres 2008). The vast bulk of harvested marine 
life is caught wild. The Indonesian seas include some of the world's rich-
est fishing grounds and Indonesia is the world's fourth largest producer 
of fish after China, Peru and India. There are enormous practical obsta-
cles to measuring the size of the annual catch of any marine life, but plau-
sible estimates of the current annual catch range from 3.7 to 7.7 million 
tonnes, compared with 2.8 million tonnes in 1994 (Delfs 2006). 
Fishing has traditionally provided incomes for millions of people in 
coastal villages across the archipelago. Although capture fishing has been 
the most important source of employment in the marine sector, the farm-
ing of shrimp takes place on a vast scale in the coastal regions of west-
ern Indonesia, and the cultivation of milkfish (bandeng, Chanos clzanos) 
is increasingly important. The government began to promote shrimp 
farming in the mid-1970s and to develop intensive farming techniques 
from the mid-1980s. In 1995 a catastrophic viral disease struck most of 
the shrimp farms, reducing production by 90 per cent, but production 
eventually resumed in southern Sumatra. Although an Indonesian firm, 
PT Central Proteinaprima, is the world's largest cultivated shrimp pro-
ducer, the total area of shrimp farms declined from 231,460 hectares in 
1989 to 132,800 hectares in 2005. A large part of the production (279,543 
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tonnes in 2005) is exported, and shrimp has become an important source 
of foreign exchange. Seaweed is also cultivated sporadically, and aquac-
ulture is reported to employ about 2.5 million people in Indonesia.8 
In recent decades the sea has become increasingly important as a 
source of minerals. The first mineral to be extracted from the sea was salt, 
which was harvested from early times on the beaches of many islands in 
the archipelago (Knaap and Nagtegaal1991; Butcher 1996). The offshore 
dredging of tin began in the 1890s (Moolhuijzen 1972). Offshore extrac-
tion of oil began in 1971 with Arco's opening of the Cinta and Arjuna 
fields off West Java. This area remains the richest offshore oil region in 
Indonesia, though production is now in decline. Also important from the 
1970s were the fields off the coast of Southeast Sumatra. More recently, 
both shallow and deep-sea oilfields have been discovered in the Makas-
sar Strait (Ooi Jin-bee 1982: 12; Tangsubkul1982: 82; Barnes 1995: 79). 
Extraction of natural gas off the coast of West Java began in the early 
1970s, and soon expanded to the eastern Java Sea and the seas around 
the Natuna Islands. The geomorphology of eastern Indonesia led many 
geologists to doubt that significant oil or gas reserves would be found 
there, but Arco discovered a huge offshore gas field at Tangguh in Bin-
tuni Bay in 1997 and there are reports of major offshore fields in Aceh. 
In all, Indonesia is estimated to have around 2.8 trillion cubic metres of 
proven offshore natural gas reserves.9 Increasing attention is also being 
given to other seabed minerals. Early interest in polymetallic nodules 
(formerly known as manganese nodules) has been followed by attention 
to hydrothermal sulphides containing gold, silver, copper, lead and zinc, 
which have been reported from the Sulawesi Sea north of Manado, and to 
cobalt-rich ferro-manganese crusts.10 Indonesia is also estimated to have 
on its seafloor 24.3 trillion cubic metres of methane hydrate, regarded by 
some experts as a major future source of energy to supplement oil anq 
gas. 
In recent times, sand and coral have been mined on an increasing scale 
for building and construction purposes (Bentley 1998). Until 2002, there 
8 See Siregar (1999); ADB (2006); USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (2008); 
'Indonesia's CP Prima to spend US$242 mln on shrimp production', Panorama 
Acuicola, 7 December 2007, available at http:/ jwww.panoramaacuicola.com/ 
noticia.php?art_clave=4200, accessed 9 December 2008. On seaweed cultiva-
tion, see Backhaus and WaJty (1995). 
9 'Official energy statistics from the U.S. government: Indonesia', available at 
http:// www.eia.doe .gov / emeu /cabs/ Indonesia/ N aturalGas.html, accessed 
3 March 2009. 
10 'The dawn of deep ocean mining', ScienceDaily, 21 February 2006, avail-
able at http:/ jwww.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/02/060221090149.htm, 
accessed 5 November 2008. 
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was a significant export of sand mined from the islands and seabeds of 
the Riau Archipelago to Singapore, where it was used for land reclama-
tion purposes. This trade was banned in 2002 because of the environ-
mental damage that mining was causing in Riau (Simamora 2002). The 
mining of sand to replenish tourist beaches has also been reported from 
Bali (Atmodjo 2008). 
The sea can be a hazard to human existence. The perils of shipwreck 
from storm or reef, or simply of individual misadventure, loom larger 
at sea than do comparable dangers on land. Pollution may not only 
damage fish stocks but also cause human illness when it passes into the 
human population through fish. Indonesia is largely outside the tropi-
cal cyclone zone, so its coastal regions are generally not subject to the 
intense winds and storm surges that repeatedly cause enormous loss of 
life in neighbouring countries, but local storms at sea can be catastrophic 
for fishermen and ferries. Indonesia's location in a zone of geological 
instability means that many of its coastal regions are vulnerable to tsu-
namis. The 2004 tsunami that devastated Aceh and claimed an estimated 
128,000 lives was the worst of a long series of such events associated with 
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions (Simkin and Fiske 1983). We are just 
beginning, moreover, to understand the role of the seas in climatic pat-
terns. The consequences of the El Nino Southern Oscillation for rainfall 
in Indonesia have been known to scientists for nearly a century, but have 
only become part of broader public knowledge in the last decade or so 
(Nicholls 1992: 167). 
The sea also has a special, if ambiguous, place in perceptions of Indo-
nesian identity. Claiming a special affection for the sea, or an attach-
ment to it, contemporary Indonesians often use a poetic term for the 
country, tanalz air (land and water), to conjure up a sense of the unity 
of land and sea in the Indonesian national imagination (see, for exam-
ple, Moertopo 1978: 73-5). Yet the expression appears to be a relatively 
recent one- it first appears not in the classical texts of Malay civilization 
but rather in the 1842 Hikayat Abdullah [The Tale of Abdullah], a work 
that is distinctively modern in vocabulary and world-view.11 Moreover, 
the most celebrated appearance of the term tanah air in nationalist lit-
erature-in Muhammad Yamin's poem Tanah Air-refers to the fresh 
water that nourishes the land, not to the sea that surrounds it. Another 
commonly cited poetic term, nusantara (islands in between), draws atten-
tion to Indonesia's archipelagic character, but does not focus on the sea 
itself (Kusumaatmadja 1982). The best known sign of cultural attachment 
between Indonesians and the sea is the widespread belief in the legend 
11 See the Malay Concordance Project, available at http:/ /mcp.anu.edu.au/N/ 
Abd.H_bib.html, accessed 6 November 2008. 
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of Nyai Lora Kidul, the goddess of the southern seas who is the spiritual 
consort of the rulers of Java according to one set of legends. These stories, 
however, suggest that the sea is a counterpoint to the human world of the 
land, a place where humans do not really belong rather than an integral 
part of human existence.12 
Emotional connection with the sea, like attachment to land, is a real 
cultural phenomenon that is notoriously difficult to measure and seri-
ously prone to platitude and exaggeration. It is partly a consequence 
of a prosaic sense of dependence on the sea for livelihood, especially in 
fishing communities. In more complex ways it has to do with the sense 
of having special knowledge about the sea-an ability to 'read' the sea, 
for instance, or to identify an underwater hazard such as a reef, or to 
foresee a change of wind or the approach of a storm-that enhances the 
prospects for survival in a dangerous environment.13 Such an emotional 
connection arises from and is expressed in the belief that the sea itself 
has a special spiritual character or is the home of spiritual beings, such 
as the 'sea wives' of pearl divers in the Aru Islands (Spyer 1997). It may 
even relate to the use of the sea for leisure activities. Although there is a 
substantial literature on the role of entertainment in Indonesian cultures, 
little attention has been paid to the place of leisure in general in modern 
Indonesia.14 Anecdotal evidence suggests that Indonesia has only a mea-
gre culture of maritime leisure- surfing is mainly the preserve of foreign 
visitors, as is recreational sea-fishing, diving and yachting.15 A cultural 
history of Indonesian imaginings of the sea is yet to be written. 
It is safe to say, however, that attachment to the sea is unevenly spread 
among Indonesia's many peoples. A few communities- the Orang Suku 
Laut (Sea People) of western Indonesia and the Bajau of eastern Indo-
nesia- traditionally lived in intimate association with the sea, not only 
drawing their livelihood from it but living on it aboard their vessels 
(Chou 2003; Lowe 2003). For others-peasant farmers in Java, plantation 
workers in Sumatra, mountain dwellers throughout the archipelago-
the sea is a remote and alien place, with no more than a minor part in 
their national imagining. There are strong signs, too, that the Orang Suku 
Laut and Bajau are losing their fornter close association with the sea. The 
12 On Nyai Loro Kidul, see Jordaan (1984) and Wessing (1988: 56-7). 
13 On the creation of attachment to land (and, by implication, the sea) that arises 
from surviving the hazards it presents, see Narangoa and Cribb (2003). 
14 See, however, the important work by van Leeuwen (1997, 2005). 
15 The late President Soeharto was fond of big-game fishing, but this enthusi-
asm did not spread widely within the Indonesian elite. On Indonesia as a 
destination for foreign surfers, see Lueras et al. (2002); for a glimpse of the 
early history of recreational use of the sea in Indonesia, see Rinkes, van Zal-
inge and de Roever (1927: 209-40). 
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need to educate their children is a powerful incentive for them to move 
onshore, and local governments also encourage it as a means of social 
betterment (Hajramurni 2008). As land-based communications improve, 
too, many coastal communities are becoming gradually less oriented to 
the sea in their day-to-day lives. 
MANAGING THE SEAS 
Governing the maritime realm has always posed distinct challenges to 
governments, different from those of ruling the land. The physical fluid-
ity of the sea has three far-reaching consequences for governance. First, 
it is always difficult (and mostly impossible) to mark any clear border 
on the sea or to place an installation at any fixed point on the sea's sur-
face. This absence of fixity greatly complicates any attempt to establish or 
maintain a governmental presence at sea or to make the extent of a gov-
ernment's claims clear to visitors. Second, the sea is dangerous. Most of 
the hazards found on land exist in one form or another at sea as well, but 
hardly anywhere on land is the possibility of death as close and as con-
stant as it is at sea. Third, the sea is multi-layered. Governance regimes 
on land normally make a distinction between air column, surface and 
subsoil. Governance at sea, in contrast, must take account of air column, 
surface, water column, seabed and subsoil, each of them different realms. 
This multi-dimensionality means that different governance challenges 
may exist at different levels at a single spot on the map. 
These difficulties of governance mean that most activities at sea 
require a higher level of technology and skill than do comparable activi-
ties on land. For this reason, changes in the mastery of technology have 
historically been of huge importance in determining access to and control 
of the sea. Developments in European shipping design and navigational 
technology brought European ships to Indonesia from the sixteenth cen-
tury, leading to a profound transformation of the archipelago (Glete 2000: 
87-8). The ability to mount cannon on ships cemented Western suprem-
acy. Later advances in the technology of navigation and mapping have 
produced dramatic changes in the capacity to locate and harvest fish and 
minerals at sea. 
Although Indonesians have a long history of seafaring prowess, they 
have been relatively weak in mastering new technologies that would 
enable the government to control its seas. Lack of capital and of state 
revenue is one source of the problem. Although Indonesia has enjoyed 
substantial income for many years from the export of natural resources, 
there has always been significant internal competition for that income, 
and the relatively high costs of marine technology have been a constant 
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disadvantage in the struggle for budget allocations. Indonesia's rul-
ers, moreover, have a long tradition of making a virtue of the lack of 
access to technology by emphasizing political solutions over technologi-
cal ones. During the independence struggle against the Dutch, leaders 
like Sukarno consciously adopted a strategy of embedding nationalist 
consciousness among the people, forecasting that Dutch power would 
fall away if Indonesians could be persuaded out of their deference to 
colonial authority. In stark contrast, for instance, to Leninist revolution-
aries, the Indonesian nationalists paid little attention to the technologies 
of revolution that might have brought them to power (Legge 1972: 102-3, 
115).16 The same reliance on popular will was evident when, faced with 
superior Dutch arms, Indonesia's military leaders developed the defence 
doctrine known as Hankamrata (Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta), or Total 
People's Defence, under which what was said to be an integral relation-
ship between the people and the armed forces compensated for a lack of 
sophisticated weaponry (Cribb 2001). 
Even under the New Order (1966-98), when significant sums were 
invested in infrastructure and technology, the dominant mood in cabinet 
tended to be hostile to interventionist, technological fixes. The so-called 
'technocrats' who dominated New Order policy making for at least two 
decades from 1966 took a neoclassical approach that stressed macro-
economic settings and avoided direct economic interventions. Only with 
the rise in influence of the technology minister, B.J. Habibie, in the second 
half of the 1980s did the so-called 'technologs' win a serious say in gov-
ernment, precipitating ambitious spending on projects whose attraction 
lay in attempts to master advanced technology (Hill 1995). Even then, 
Habibie was in constant conflict with those who favoured a more politi-
cal and less technological approach to government. 
The consequent lack of mastery of maritime technology has been 
reflected in several enduring management problems at sea. Indonesia 
has been generally weak in combating sea-borne criminal activities. 
Smuggling was widespread during the colonial era (Tagliacozzo 2005) 
and continued to be important after Indonesia became independent. 
During the war of independence, the Indonesian government itself spon-
sored clandestine trade to obtain funds for the struggle against the Dutch 
(Homan 1983; Cribb 1988). The problem was most acute in the 1950s and 
1960s, when central government policies were hugely disadvantageous 
to exporters, many of whom were located close to alternative markets 
16 Indeed, the communist leader D.N. Aidit evidently relied in much the same 
way on popular spirit and paid the same scant attention to technique in his 
attempt to shift political power towards the Communist Party in October 
1965 (Roosa 2006). 
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across the maritime border. The scale of smuggling may have dimin-
ished during the New Order but it remained a serious problem (Simkin 
1970). These days it includes, on the one hand, the import of drugs, of 
items that undercut Indonesia's own industries (ranging from processed 
steel to used clothing) and of contraband that circumvents Indonesian 
tariffs (such as alcohol and tobacco), and, on the other hand, the export 
of cash, endangered wildlife species, antiquities and subsidized fuel and 
fertilizer. The problem remains so serious that the government recently 
considered closing the Sumatran port of Bagan Siapi-Api to foreign trade 
because of widespread stnuggling and underinvoicing (Dameria 2008). 
Djoko Sumaryono (Chapter 8) notes both the difficulty of coordinating 
the different government agencies responsible for maritime affairs and 
the recent achievements of Indonesia's Maritime Security Coordinating 
Board (Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut, or Bakorkamla). 
Piracy, especially in the Malacca Strait, is also a serious problem, 
although Sam Bateman (Chapter 7) notes significant improvement in 
recent times. In the aftermath of Soeharto' s fall in 1998, there was a weak-
ening of surveillance in maritime areas, with the consequence that there 
were 113 piracy incidents- more than a third of the world's reported 
pirate attacks- in Indonesian waters in 1999. In 2002, Indonesia com-
menced joint patrols with India in the Andaman Sea approaches to the 
Malacca Strait, and in 2004 Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore began 
joint patrols in the strait itself. In 2005, the United States offered to donate 
40 coast-guard ships, old but still serviceable, to the Indonesian authori-
ties to help them patrol the Malacca Strait. Nonetheless, Indonesian 
authorities acknowledge that they still have difficulty marshalling the 
capacity to patrol the region effectively. In line with the government's tra-
ditional preference to seek a political rather than technological solution, 
counterpiracy measures have included efforts to improve the standard 
of living in coastal districts (kabupaten) along the Malacca Strait (Rokan 
Hilir, Bengkalis, Siak, Palawan, Indragiri Ilir, Karimun), as well as other 
regions near major sea lanes. The expectation is that improved economic 
conditions will diminish the attraction of piracy.17 
Indonesia faces a similarly perennial problem with illegal fishing. 
During the 1970s, serious concerns began to arise over the possibility 
of overfishing in Indonesian waters, leading to the banning of trawling 
in 1980, except in the Arafura Sea. This measure was followed by others 
to limit catches and restrict the access of foreign vessels to Indonesian 
17 See Dillon (2000); EklOf (2006); Ho (2006: 565-6); Permal (2006); 'India, Indo-
nesia hold joint patrol', Jakarta Post, 13 October 2008, available at http:// 
www. thejakartapost.com/ news/ 2008/10/13/ india-indonesia-hold-joint-
patrol.html, accessed 10 December 2008. 
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waters. Nevertheless, huge volumes of fish, shellfish and other marine 
life are caught illegally within the archipelago and substantial amounts 
leave in the holds of foreign fishing vessels operating without permits, or 
with permits that have been transferred illegally from Indonesian licence 
holders to foreign fishers (Agoes 2005; Williams 2007). As with piracy, the 
government's instinctive response to illegal fishing has been to empha-
size political and social solutions, rather than simple surveillance and 
punishment, recognizing the poor social conditions in fishing communi-
ties that lead to the infringement of regulations. 
Indonesia also has a relatively weak record in developing regulatory 
regimes for activities at sea. As Sarah Waddell indicates in Chapter 11 of 
this volume, the overall legal regime governing Indonesian fisheries is 
relatively underdeveloped, despite the passing of a new Fisheries Law 
(Law No. 31/2004) in 2004 (Patlis 2007).18 Indonesian waters encompass 
a vast range of ecological zones, including mangrove swamps, coral 
reefs, seagrass beds, open ocean and deep sea trenches. The conservation 
of these resources has been marked by sophisticated rhetoric in Jakarta 
and deficient delivery of results in the field (Arnscheidt 2009). The issue 
of marine pollution remains seriously underaddressed. As the country 
industrialized during the later decades of the Soeharto era, scant atten-
tion was paid to the dumping of industrial waste in rivers, which in turn 
polluted the seas (Cribb 1990: 1,124-5; Djalal2000). The consequence was 
repeated instances of damage to coastal capture fisheries and aquacul-
ture. The prosecution of offenders was infrequent. 
Indonesia's lack of mastery of modern technology has also been 
apparent in its handling of legal economic activities at sea. In the legal 
fishing industry, Indonesian enterprises are generally outclassed by for-
eign ventures. The Indonesian section of the industry is dominated by 
small, artisanal fishers, while the high-tech sector is dominated by for-
eign or joint venture firms. Indonesia has maintained somewhat closer 
control of the extraction of oil, gas and other minerals from the sea but it 
remains largely dependent on foreign-owned technology and entrepre-
neurship in these sectors. 
Marine safety is another major issue. As Erwin Rosmali demonstrates 
in Chapter 9 of this volume, Indonesia has witnessed repeated ferry dis-
asters and accompanying loss of life. Several elements contribute to the 
problem of safety in Indonesian waters. Many vessels are old, and not 
all captains, navigators and other seafarers are properly trained. Many 
vessels lack basic navigational equipment. The checking of safety equip-
ment is often rudimentary and vessels are often overloaded. Indonesia's 
search and rescue capacity is limited. As a result, accidents caused by bad 
18 On the history of fishing in Indonesia, see Butcher (2004). 
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weather or faulty equipment can lead to extensive loss of life. Fishing 
and smaller commuter vessels are also regularly lost at sea. 
Nor does Indonesia have a strong record in managing the interests 
of the approximately 72,000 Indonesians who are reported to work as 
seafarers, 60 per cent of them on Indonesian ships and the remainder on 
foreign-registered vessels (Sijabat 2002). Indonesia is one of the world's 
largest sources of seafarers for international shipping. Few of them speak 
English, however, or have the training to work on larger vessels, and a 
recent International Labour Organization (ILO) report suggests that con-
ditions in the industry are poor (ILO 2002). Many seafarers do not receive 
the minimum wage, 19 and work in conditions that breach standard 
safety requirements. Many have to pay up-front to get their jobs and are 
required to sign two contracts, one for the record that meets ILO stand-
ards and another that reflects actual conditions of work. The Indonesian 
Seafarers Union (Kesatuan Pelaut Indonesia, or KPI), established by the 
Directorate General of Marine Transport, has not been an effective nego-
tiator with shipowners and is not recognized by the ILO. The extensive 
use of flags of convenience by vessels operating in Indonesian waters has 
added to the difficulty of monitoring conditions.20 
Indonesia has been slow to develop an efficient network of interisland 
passenger and cargo services. When the New Order came to power 
in 1966, there were no formal passenger services between Indonesia's 
islands; passengers had no choice but to travel by cargo ship, mostly on 
deck. Under the Perintis project, the New Order government agreed to 
subsidize specific regular services, but the initiative began poorly when 
the first ferry introduced under this venture, the state-owned, second-
hand, roll-on/roll-off Tampomas II, sank in 1981 with the loss of 580 lives. 
Between 1983 and 1987, the government purchased six new vessels from 
Germany and with them provided regular passenger services between 
the major ports for the first time since 1957. Nine more ships entered 
service between 1987 and 1994 (Rutz 1987: 491; Rutz and Coull1996: 278; 
19 A 1996 survev indicated that Russian, Ukrainian, Croatian and Indonesian 
seafarers rece'ived the lowest rates of pay in the industry, regardless of the 
country of registration of the ships on which they were working (DeSombre 
2006: 137). 
20 'Seafarers demand better payment, welfare', Jakarta Post, 30 July 2002, 
available at http:/ /www.thejakartapost.comjnews/2002/07 /30/seafarers-
demand-better-payment-welfare.html; 'Uphold safety management in RI 
waters: seafarers', Jakarta Post, 9 April 2007, available at http:/ jwww.the 
jakartapost.com/ news/ 2007/04/09/ uphold-safety-management-ri-waters-
seafarers.html; 'Shipping woes due to govt failings', Jakarta Post, 5 Novem-
ber 2008, available at http:/ jwww.thejakartapost.comjnews/2008/11/05/ 
shipping-woes-due-govt-failings.html, all accessed 9 November 2008. 
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Dick 2008). Until1985 the interisland shipping system was highly regu-
lated, with access to particular routes based largely on a licensing system, 
but reforms carried out between 1985 and 1988 removed many of these 
restrictions (Dick and Forbes 1992; ESCAP 1999). As we see from David 
Ray's chapter in this book, Indonesia has also lagged in managing its 
port facilities. Indonesian ports are notorious for their slow turnaround 
times, lack of facilities and general poor management, a situation that 
represents an unnecessary tax on interisland trade. 
Still less impressive is Indonesia's management of its maritime her-
itage. Thanks to the archipelago's long history of maritime commerce, 
the Indonesian seas are littered with shipwrecks dating back at least two 
millennia. These wrecks are potentially a source of great insight into the 
early commercial and cultural history of the region (Flecker 2001), but 
Indonesia has not given high priority to protecting its marine archaeo-
logical heritage. Shipwrecks and other marine heritage sites do not come 
under the authority of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, which is 
responsible for archaeological sites on land, but rather under the Minis-
try of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, which has little institutional reason 
to be interested in heritage. When a tenth-century shipwreck contain-
ing rubies, glass and thousands of pieces of pottery was discovered by 
fishermen off the northern coast of West Java in 2000, the response of the 
ministry was to retain 10 per cent of the cache and auction off the rest. 
'It has more economic value than historical value, there is no need to 
take it for our heritage museums', said a ministry spokesperson (Cuno 
2008: 46). The growing sophistication of underwater scanning technol-
ogy has exposed increasing numbers of shipwrecks to illegal plunder for 
the international antiquities market, but it is still the case that most new 
shipwreck sites are discovered by trawlers and diving fishermen (Flecker 
2002). 
Indonesia's naval defences have not been tested in conflict since the 
1960s. Indonesia's naval encounter with the Dutch off Vlakke Hoek 
(Tanjung Namaripi) in 1962 during the confrontation over West New 
Guinea (now Papua) ended in defeat, although the threat of naval action 
on a larger scale was one element in the eventual Dutch decision to 
give up control of the territory (Slot and Hendriks 2002). Throughout 
the period since independence, the Hankamrata doctrine has meant that 
Indonesian defence planning has given little attention to the navy as a 
first line of defence against foreign intrusion; the consequence has been 
small budgets and a relatively low general standing for the navy within 
the armed forces (Suryohadiprojo 1973; Dupont 1996).21 Indonesia's most 
21 On the history of the Indonesian navy, see Cahyono (1992) and Leirissa 
(2006). 
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effective innovation in marine surveillance, in fact, has been a political 
rather than a technological one: the government has recruited fishermen 
as part of its national security system under an arrangen1ent known as 
sistem pengawasan masyarakat (siswasmas), or community surveillance sys-
tem (Patlis 2007: 219). Pressure on Indonesia to enhance its technological 
capacity for surveillance has increased in recent times with the emerging 
fear of a possible terrorist attack in Southeast Asian waters. The principal 
fear has been that a hijacked vessel might arrive in Singapore via Indo-
nesian waters as a floating explosive device, causing serious loss of life, 
extensive damage to infrastructure and a loss of confidence in the main 
container route through the Malacca Strait (Luft and Korin 2004; Sukma 
2005; Ho 2006: 563-5). 
If Indonesia has performed poorly in mastering the technology of 
managing the seas, it has also been unimpressive in its management of 
technology that might help to transcend Indonesia's archipelagic charac-
ter. Except in the Riau Islands, where the then technology minister, B.J. 
Habibie, took the initiative to build a chain of six bridges connecting the 
islands of Batam, Rempang and Galang (Chou and Wee 2002: 351-2), 
Indonesia has not followed the example of other sea-bound countries, 
such as Denmark, Norway and Japan, in constructing bridges to connect 
islands. Although there has been a proposal for a bridge between Java 
and Madura, and between Java and Bali, neither has moved beyond the 
speculative stage (Leinbach and Ulack 1999: 221; Pringle 2004: 220-21). 
Although the record of Indonesia's technological management of the 
sea is a somewhat dismaying account of indifferent performance, the 
Indonesian inclination to seek effective political solutions has generated 
an impressive record in developing a political regime to govern the sea. 
The challenge in creating a political regime in maritime areas lies not in 
making laws that are consistent with the national interest, social rights 
and natural justice, but rather in producing laws that reflect both the spe-
cific character of the sea itself and the current capacity of states to govern 
it. Laws that cannot be implemented serve little purpose, as was shown 
centuries ago by the Treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Zaragossa (1529), 
in which Spain and Portugal agreed to divide the world, including the 
oceans, between them. Although this division was endorsed by the Pope, 
it quickly became a dead letter because the Iberian powers were unable 
to enforce their claims against the intrusion of the northern Europeans. 
Indonesia's contribution to the Law of the Sea since the 1950s has 
been strong. The articles in this volume by John G. Butcher (Chapter 2), 
Arif Havas Oegroseno (Chapter 3), Hasjim Djalal (Chapter 4) and I Made 
Andi Arsana and Clive Schofield (Chapter 5) reflect the fact that, for more 
than five decades, Indonesia has been at the forefront in devising new 
laws to reflect changing governmental capacity at sea. Most important of 
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all has been Indonesia's development of the archipelagic state as a con-
cept in international law. The consequence has been to create a new cat-
egory of jurisdiction, archipelagic waters, which are recognized as part 
of the maritime territory of some two dozen archipelagic states around 
the world. The establishment of the concept of archipelagic waters has in 
turn required- in the case of Indonesia and the Philippines- the devel-
opment of a regime for transarchipelagic passage known as archipelagic 
sea lanes. 
In negotiating its maritime boundaries with Australia, Indonesia 
pioneered innovative means of recognizing the complexity of maritime 
resource exploitation. Under the Timor Gap Treaty of 1989, Indonesia 
and Australia shelved what had proven to be irreconcilable differences 
over the principle on which the maritime zone between Australia and 
what was then the Indonesian province of East Timor should be divided. 
Instead, they created a 'zone of cooperation', divided into three separate 
areas of exploitation, with each country having a different share of the 
responsibilities for each area (Prescott 1993c).22 Then, in 1997, Indonesia 
and Australia signed a further treaty demarcating the entire EEZ bound-
ary between the two countries. The innovative feature of this treaty 
was that it created separate, overlapping EEZ regimes for the water 
column (including fishing rights, which went to Indonesia) and the sea-
bed (including mining rights, which went to Australia) (Prescott 1993a, 
1993b, 1997). 
One of the challenges for contemporary Indonesia is to decide whether 
and how to extend the imaginative approach to marine territoriality to 
the issue of marine tenure. In Western law, which forms the principal 
basis of Indonesian law, private ownership of the sea is not possible, and 
there is no easy way to recognize the traditional rights of individuals over 
areas of sea. Where such recognition exists in practice, it most commonly 
takes the form of licences granted by the state, on its own authority, to 
individuals or groups whom it judges to be traditional users. Customary 
marine tenure- that is, the public recognition of traditional ownership 
of marine resources- is common in parts of eastern Indonesia, despite 
evidence that it is a relatively recent construction (Osseweijer 2001: 
111-15; Bubandt 2005), but it receives no support in Indonesian law. The 
Indonesian constitution, moreover, is well known for explicitly subordi-
nating private ownership of land to the broader national interest. Arti-
cle 33(3) states succinctly: 'The land, the waters and the natural riches 
contained therein shall be controlled by the State and exploited to the 
greatest benefit of the people'. The legal environment for recognition of 
22 This treaty became a dead letter in 1999 with the independence of the prov-
ince as Timor-Leste. 
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customary marine tenure is thus unpromising. James J. Fox (Chapter 12) 
draws attention to the difficulties the Australian government has faced 
in regulating 'traditional' uses of marine resources in regions that are 
now within Australia's jurisdiction. An ironic consequence is that mari-
time and coastal communities such as the Orang Suku Laut have sought 
first of all to establish a claim to land. Cynthia Chou quotes a member of 
this community, which is famous above all for its identity with life at sea, 
speaking of territory purely in terms of land: 
For us, we have been on this land since we were young children. This is tanah 
kanzi (our land) and not the tanah of others .... [O)ur father, mother and sib-
lings are all buried here. We do not want to disturb them .... We do not want 
to move to another island. We just want to live and die in this one island, 
which is ours (Chou 1997: 616). 
Within Indonesia, however, conservation groups have been develop-
ing creative measures to combine marine conservation with traditional 
exploitation of sea resources (Sa tria, Sano and Shima 2006). There is some 
prospect that this approach will lead to significant changes in maritime 
environmental management. Rili Djohani (Chapter 10) suggests that the 
Indonesian government performs best in environmental protection (as 
in defence) when it emphasizes the political rather than technical aspects 
of management. 
Indonesia is at a vital juncture in the management of its seas. Partly 
for historical reasons, partly thanks to its vigorous contributions to the 
framing of the Law of the Sea, Indonesia is recognized as possessing 5.8 
million square kilometres of sea, and may soon come to possess more if 
its proposal for an extended continental shelf is accepted. With this vast 
area come substantial opportunities- the seabed will be one of the great 
resource frontiers of the twenty-first century and new opportunities 
for productively managing the ecology of marine areas are constantly 
emerging. Yet with this opportunity come responsibilities and threats. 
As a contributor to the international order, Indonesia will be obliged to 
exercise more direct authority over the seas under its control- protecting 
them from degradation and ensuring the safety of those who traverse 
them, while ensuring its own security and economic interests. Success in 
bringing effective governance to this vast realm will be crucial in Indone-
sia's economic and social development. 
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